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Abstract
An advocate for a special interest provides information to an uninformed plan-
ner for her to consider in making a sequence of important decisions. Although the
advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is is also known that the
advocate is biased and will distort his advice if necessary to in￿ uence the planner￿ s
decision. Each time she repeats the problem, however, the planner learns about the
accuracy of the advocate￿ s recommendation, mitigating some of the advocate￿ s in-
centive to act in a self-serving manner. We propose a theory of dynamic delegation
to explain why planners do sometimes rely on information provided by advocates
in making decisions. The interaction takes place in two phases, a communication
phase, followed by a sequence of decisions and learning by the planner. We ￿rst
establish that the capability to delegate dynamically is a necessary condition for
in￿ uential communication in this setting, and characterize the optimal dynamic del-
egation policy. Next, we show that a planner may prefer to consult an an advocate
rather than a neutral adviser. Finally, we demonstrate how an advocate gains in￿ u-
ence with a decision maker by making his preferences for actions unpredictable. Our
results have implications for a variety of real world interactions including regulation,
organization, and whistleblowing.
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A representative of a polluting ￿rm gives testimony to a regulatory agency about the
economic and environmental impact of stricter emission standards. Although the exact
impact of this regulation can not be known in advance, the polluting ￿rm knows what
the consequences of the regulation are likely to be. However, because stronger emissions
standards act as a constraint on the ￿rm, the ￿rm has an incentive to make exaggerated
claims about the likely costs of regulation and to downplay its likely bene￿ts in order to
manipulate the regulator into adopting weaker standards. Even though the polluter has
valuable information for the regulatory agency, the polluter￿ s incentives to make distorted
claims act as a signi￿cant barrier to the in￿ uential communication of this information.
Over time, however, the regulatory agency can observe the consequences of its decisions and
can therefore learn about the impact of the emission standards through its own experience.
In this paper, we study the consequences of this type of learning.
This situation is an example of a decision maker "relying on advice from interested
parties." This pervasive practice has been much studied by economists and political sci-
entists, but is still not completely understood. In the situation that we study, a decision
maker or planner solicits a recommendation from an informed advisor. The advisor is
known to have strong preferences for actions that always con￿ ict with the planner￿ s best
interest. Just as the polluting ￿rm bene￿ts when emissions standards are weakened, the
advisor always bene￿ts when the planner increases her action. To re￿ ect the extreme na-
ture of the advisor￿ s preferences, we refer to him as an advocate rather than as the more
neutral "sender" or "expert." We assume that the use of message-contingent transfers are
prohibited for institutional or legal reasons. To make the situation even more di¢ cult, the
accuracy of the advocate￿ s recommendation can not be immediately established; the advo-
cate is therefore free to distort his recommendation to his own advantage without worrying
that his self-serving behavior will be immediately exposed.1 However, if the planner faces
a sequence of decisions, she will learn about the accuracy of the advocate￿ s advice through
her own experience.
Economic analysis of this type of situation can be divided into two broad categories:
1A large literature analyzes the disclosure of information that can not be falsi￿ed (hard information).
See Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Milgrom (1981), Cotton (2009, 2010), Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Bull and Watson (2007, 2004), Che and Kartik (2010).
1strategic communication and delegation. Under strategic communication, the decision
maker can not commit to her response to the advisor￿ s message; she can only choose an
action that is sequentially rational given the recommendation she receives, accounting
for the motives and reporting strategy of the advisor.2 In contrast, under delegation,
the decision maker commits herself to a speci￿c action associated with each report.3 In
essence, in the delegation framework, the decision maker commits to a menu of actions
from which the advisor can select optimally given his private information. When the
planner must make a sequence of decisions, the planner can also delegate decisions to the
advisor dynamically, by committing to an action in each period that depends on both
the advocate￿ s recommendation and on information that the planner has learned from her
own experience. In this environment, the planner can use information revealed later in the
interaction to provide the advocate with incentives to issue truthful a recommendation.
In this paper we characterize and analyze this type of dynamic delegation.
Our analysis breaks new ground by combining delegation with learning on the part
of the planner in a simple and ￿ exible framework. Our investigation centers on a model
of communication that captures the salient features of advocacy relationships that we
have described. In a sequential setting, a planner adjusts her action in each period to
match an unknown state of the world; in the context of the previous example, the state of
the world represents the optimal emission standard, given a particular period￿ s costs and
bene￿ts. The state in each period is stochastic, and is publicly revealed after the planner
has selected an action.4 The planner is uncertain about the distribution of the state. An
advisor (the polluting ￿rm) knows the distribution from which the states are drawn, either
￿H or ￿L, but like the planner is unable to observe the state until after the planner selects
an action. The advisor is known to be an advocate; he always prefers that the planner
increase her action (reduce the standard), independent of the true state. The theory we
propose addresses the fundamental problem that advocates pose for planners: the planner
clearly bene￿ts from knowing the state distribution at the beginning of the interaction,
2Crawford and Sobel (1982), Dessein (2002), Ambrus and Egorov (2009), Chakraborty and Harbaugh
(2009), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2010)
3Holmstrom (1977), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Ambrus and Egorov (2009)
4For simplicity we also assume that the planner￿ s ability to observe the true state after she selects her
action does not depend on the action that she chooses. This simplifying assumption may not be realistic
in certain situations. Relaxing this assumption introduces an additional tradeo⁄ into the problem, which
we leave for future work.
2but without access to payments (contingent on the advocate￿ s recommendation), it is very
di¢ cult to align the advocate￿ s incentives with the planner￿ s.
We ￿rst establish that there is no in￿ uential communication in this setting under
strategic communication and static delegation. The proposed framework is therefore par-
ticularly well suited to analyzing the properties of dynamic delegation, as it is the driving
force behind in￿ uential communication. This result is not di¢ cult to understand. In a
static delegation framework, if the planner changes her action in response to the advo-
cate￿ s advice, he will always manipulate her into choosing the higher action. Absent the
ability to ￿ne the advocate for bad advice, or a future in which to punish him, the planner
has no recourse other than to ignore his advice. When there is strategic communication,
the problem is very similar. If the advocate￿ s recommendation suggests to the planner
that the low distribution is more likely, the planner will choose a lower action in each
period, hurting the advocate￿ s payo⁄. Without the ability to commit, the planner can not
assure the advocate that he won￿ t be penalized for revealing the low distribution With-
out this assurance, we show that no informative communication equilibrium exists. These
no-communication results are rather disappointing, but predictable, given the disparate
preferences of the parties and the limited agreements that are available for governing the
planner￿ s behavior in response to the advocate￿ s advice.
We then show that under dynamic delegation, it is possible for the parties to arrange
for the advocate to advise the planner, and characterize the optimal delegation policy.
Under the optimal arrangement, when the advocate reports ￿L; the distribution he ￿nds
unfavorable, the planner commits to a ￿xed long term action that exceeds the action she
￿nds optimal under the low distribution. We interpret this as a compromise the planner
makes in return for the advocate￿ s report of unfavorable news. When the advocate reports
that the distribution is ￿H; i.e. favorable, the planner commits to a sequence of actions
that is contingent on the history of observed states. The actions converge towards the
planner￿ s optimal action under ￿H when the history of state observations supports the
advocate￿ s claim that the distribution is actually favorable. However, if the history of
observed states contradicts the advocate￿ s claim, the planner￿ s actions are progressively
reduced. We interpret this as the planner￿ s commitment to trust the advocate￿ s advice, as
long as his advice appears valid given her experience. The planner￿ s ability to distinguish
the two distributions from the observed history in￿ uences the magnitude of the second
3best distortions and the welfare gains of dynamic delegation.
Our analysis provides some clues as to the origins of advocacy by describing situations
in which advocates are preferred to impartial advisors. Most analyses of advocacy presume
that planners rely on advocates for advice because advocates must be informed about issues
that they care so much about. While this is often true it doesn￿ t explain why planners
don￿ t prefer to consult other informed but potentially less biased sources for advice.
One rationale for preferring advocates to impartial advisers, implied by our theory,
is that it is easier to motivate advocates to acquire information than impartial advisors.
Suppose the planner may consult a biased advocate or an objective adviser for information
on what action to take. The advocate and impartial advisor must both expend resources
of c > 0 to become informed. Once informed, the impartial advisor truthfully reports his
information, whereas the advocate requires the planner to adopt certain costly actions in
return for revealing his information truthfully.
We show, surprisingly, that it can be less costly for the planner to obtain information
from the advocate than from the impartial adviser. Because the advocate cares about the
planner￿ s actions while the impartial advisor doesn￿ t, the advocate can be motivated to
learn through the planner￿ s actions, while the impartial advisor will only learn if his cost is
fully reimbursed. When the advocate has a strong incentive to correctly communicate the
state distribution he subsidizes learning; the distorted actions necessary to induce learning
generate a smaller payo⁄ cost to the planner than the cost of learning, c. Ironically our
theory shows that it is the advocate￿ s extreme preference for high actions that sometimes
makes him a more attractive source of information than an objective advisor.
Our results imply that an advocate with a known preferences for high actions has no
impact on the planner￿ s expected action choice; the planner chooses the same average
action whether or not she is advised by the advocate.5 Although the advocate￿ s advice
in￿ uences the planner to make better decisions to the planner￿ s bene￿t, the advocate is
unable to induce the planner to select higher actions on average. Advocates are severely
constrained by the causes that they are identi￿ed with; it is ironic that once an advocate
becomes a known supporter of a particular issue, he relinquishes his ability to impact the
planners choice of action on that issue. In contrast, when the planner is uncertain whether
5While this result is certainly a consequence of some assumptions of our model about the planner￿ s
preferences, we still ￿nd this result interesting, especially as it relates to some of the later results.
4the advisor is an advocate or impartial, our theory shows that the advocate commands
a rent to reveal his con￿ ict of interest, leading to a higher average action. Suppose the
planner has several distinct types of decisions to make. She consults with an advisor who
has extreme preferences for one unknown type of decision, but is impartial with respect
to the other decisions. For any given decision, the planner does not know if the advisor
has an incentive to o⁄er biased advice. An advocate thus has an incentive to claim to
be impartial in order to give a manipulative report undeserved credibility. To make this
possibility unattractive, the planner commits to choose actions that are more aligned on
average with the advocate￿ s preferences when he reveals his con￿ ict of interest. By initially
hiding his preferences from the planner, the advocate is able to advance his agenda more
e⁄ectively.
This paper is a contribution to the literature on strategic information transmission and
delegation that began with Crawford and Sobel (1982), Grossman (81), Milgrom (81), and
Holmstrom (1977) who provide the ￿rst analyses of decision makers relying on the infor-
mation of interested parties. More recent papers in this literature include Dessein (2002),
Alonso and Matouschek (2008), and Ambrus and Egorov (2009). As in our analysis, these
authors assume in any state of the world, the advisor￿ s preferred action di⁄ers from the
decision maker￿ s. The di⁄erence between the parties￿most preferred actions represents the
degree of interest con￿ ict in the relationship. For small interest con￿ icts, these authors
show that there is in￿ uential communication under both delegation and strategic commu-
nication. In our setting, however, the con￿ ict is "in￿nite": the advocate always prefers
that the planner increase her action. With such an extreme con￿ ict of interest, strategic
communication and static delegation are ine⁄ective. Our result also contrasts with those
of Morris (2001) and Sobel (1985), who ￿nd that informative communication may exist in
repeated settings without commitment. These authors assume that the advisor￿ s prefer-
ences may be identical to those of the decision maker, and that the state changes in each
period. By issuing truthful recommendations, biased advisors may establish a reputation
for credibility, which they may pro￿tably exploit in later periods. In our setting, the advi-
sor￿ s extreme preference con￿ ict is common knowledge, so there is no scope for this type
of "investment in credibility."6 Finally Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) describe the
manner in which an advocate with multiple pieces of private information can in￿ uence a
6We discuss the possibility that the advisor is impartial in Section 6.
5decision maker. In our setting, the advocate has only a single piece of private information,
which precludes their construction.
The interest con￿ ict that we analyze may appear extreme when compared with the
literature. We are interested in this extreme con￿ ict of interest for two main reasons. First,
we believe that this setting is the most appropriate description of a variety of real situations
in regulation, organization, political economy, and interpersonal relationships. Because
the extreme con￿ ict of interest rules out the channels of communication identi￿ed in this
literature, it is not often analyzed.7 Second, because there is no in￿ uential communication
for any of the standard reasons, we believe that this is an excellent setting in which
to study the properties of dynamic delegation; any communication is a consequence of
dynamic delegation exclusively. The optimal dynamic delegation policy shares elements of
Strausz￿ s (2005) theory of interim information in employment contracts, and Cooper and
Hayes (1987) description of price discrimination in long term insurance contracts.
The process for eliciting useful, unveri￿able information frombiased parties has spawned
a large literature in economics, organization theory and political science. Krishna and Mor-
gan (2008) and Sobel (2008) are recent surveys of some of the more in￿ uential applications
of the theory. In addition to the papers discussed above, it is important to mention the con-
tributions of Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), Rantakari (2008), Battaglini (2002),
and Gentzkow and Kamenica (2010) in economics and Austen-Smith (1994) and Gross-
man and Helpman (2002) in political science. This literature encompasses a wide range of
topics and settings that the current paper does not address. Our theory focuses instead
on explaining the combination of delegation and learning in facilitating the exchange of
information for in￿ uence in long term economic and political decision processes.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Our model is presented in Section 2. In
Section 3 we analyze two benchmarks, and demonstrate that no in￿ uential communication
exists under static delegation and strategic communication. In Section 4 we characterize
the optimal dynamic delegation policy and discuss its properties. Section 5 extends our
analysis to a setting in which advocates must expend e⁄ort to learn; we also permit the
planner to choose whether to consult an impartial advisor or a known advocate for advice.
We illustrate that under dynamic delegation, a biased advocate may be preferred to an
impartial advisor. In Section 6 we allow the advocate to hide his preferences for action by
7An exception is Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2009)
6choosing the set of issues on which he o⁄ers advice. Section 7 concludes with a summary
of results and directions for further research. Proofs of formal results are contained in the
appendix.
2 The Model
A planner (e.g. lawmaker, CEO, regulator etc.) faces a decision or sequence of decisions.
In each period, the planner￿ s choice, called the action, is represented by a value q 2 R. The
planner￿ s payo⁄ in each period depends on the action she chooses and an unknown state
of the world x 2 R. Given state x and action q, her payo⁄ is a quadratic loss function:
up (q;x) = ￿(q ￿ x)
2
The planner has no inherent preferences for action; she cares only about choosing the
action that is most appropriate given the state of the environment.
In each period, the true state is independently and identically distributed, but the exact
distribution of the state in all periods is unknown to the planner. There are two possible
distributions for the state, a high distribution F (xj￿H) and a low distribution F (xj￿L);
with common support X.8 The expected value of the state under the high distribution,
￿H; is larger than the expected value of the state under the low distribution, ￿L.
E [xj￿H] = ￿H
E [xj￿L] = ￿L
￿H ￿ ￿L
Given her information at the beginning of the interaction, the planner believes the distri-
bution of the state to be the low distribution with probability ￿ 2 (0;1).
Faced with a choice of action in each period, the planner would clearly bene￿t from
knowing the true distribution at the beginning of the interaction. With quadratic prefer-
ences, her ideal action in every period is the mean of the true distribution. However, if
she doesn￿ t know the true distribution, her action in any period will re￿ ect all available
information, but it will never be her ideal action. We refer to the situation in which the
planner knows the true distribution as the ￿rst best, and her expected payo⁄ (prior to
learning the true distribution) as the ￿rst best payo⁄, denoted V N.9
8The assumption of common support can be easily relaxed.
9It is not di¢ cult to verify that V N = ￿
￿
￿￿2





7Fortunately, an advisor knows the true distribution of the state (though he has no
additional information about the realized state in each period); unfortunately the advisor
is an advocate whose payo⁄ di⁄ers from the planner￿ s:10
ua (q;x) = q
Unlike the planner, who would like to match the action to the state, the advocate would
always like the planner to choose a higher action, regardless of the true state of the world.
The advocate therefore has an incentive to claim that the distribution is ￿H, to induce her
to choose higher actions. The preference misalignment between the planner and advocate
is more extreme than the one analyzed in the cheap talk and delegation literature; the
extreme misalignment of preferences acts as a signi￿cant barrier to in￿ uential communi-
cation.
Payments between the planner and the advocate are either explicitly ruled out, or are
constrained to be independent of the advocate￿ s message. These restrictions arise for legal
or institutional reasons; payments between planners and advocates can lead to a variety
of corrupt behaviors. Without payments, the planner can reward or punish the advocate
only through her choice of action.11
The planner￿ s challenge is di¢ cult. She would like the advocate to recommend the best
action given what he knows, but it is di¢ cult for the planner to overcome the advocate￿ s
incentive to lie without paying him. Nonetheless, the advocate does have valuable infor-
mation for the planner, and the planner has the authority to select actions that bene￿t the
advocate. There are potential gains from an exchange of advice for in￿ uence, if only the
parties ￿gure out a way to exploit their common interests without monetary payments.
10More general payo⁄functions of the form ua (q;x) = g1 (x)q+g2 (x) lead to identical results, provided
for both possible distributions D 2 fH;Lg; E [g1 (x)j￿D] > 0 .
11There are two rationale for assuming that report-contingent payments are not possible. The ￿rst is
that payments for information are di¢ cult if not impossible to implement without the ability to objectively
verify the accuracy of the information that is reported. The second is that monetary transfers between
public o¢ cials and private interests may facilitate corrupt or illegal exchanges of favors or services, and is
therefore prohibited.
If monetary or non monetary utility transfers can be conditioned on the advocates report, then it is
possible to induce the advocate to reveal information. See Ambrus and Egorov (2009 a,b) in the context
of a theory of bureaucracy and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) in the context of commercial transactions.
82.1 Advice for In￿ uence Game
We model the interaction between planner and advocate as a game in which advice is
exchanged for in￿ uence. The game takes place over periods k = f0;1;::;Ng according to
the following sequence:
0. The advocate observes the true state distribution, ￿L or ￿H, and issues a recommen-
dation (or sends a message) M 2 fH;Lg:12
k=1:N. At the beginning of period k, the planner selects an action qk 2 R. Once the action
is selected, the true state xk is revealed, and both planner and advocate realize their
period k payo⁄s.
The advocate￿ s strategy is a pair of probabilities (rH;rL) 2 [0;1]
2; rX represents the
probability that the advocate reports H when the true distribution is ￿X. In each period
the planner can base her choice of action in any period on the message she receives from the







represents the set of possible histories at time k ￿ 1, and hk￿1 = (x1;:::;xk￿1) 2 Xk￿1
represents a particular history of past states,13 then the planner￿ s strategy is a family of
functions, fqM (hk￿1)g
N
k=1, each of which maps the Cartesian Product of M and Xk￿1 into
an action qk 2 R:14
qM (hk￿1) : M ￿ Hk￿1 ! R
Both planner and advocate have a common discount factor ￿:
The equilibrium that we focus on for this game will depend on the setting which best
describes the relationship between the advocate and planner. In situations where the
planner is unable to commit ex ante to a strategy (strategic communication), we analyze
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which the planner and advocate select strategies that are
12We have assumed that the message space contains only two messages. In the case of full commitment
the Revelation Principle guarantees that this assumption is without loss of generality. Without commit-
ment, this assumption can be easily relaxed with no impact on the results. We maintain this assumption
to simplify the exposition.
Furthermore, under strategic communication, if N is ￿nite, there is no gain to allowing communication
in every period. If N is in￿nite, we conjecture that this is still the case. We thank Alessandro Pavan and
Yuk-Fai Fong for these points.
13By convention, h0 is the null set and f (h0j￿) = 1:
14Throughout the paper we avoid discussing issues related to variations in the decision maker￿ s strategy
on sets of measure zero without loss of substance. Readers uncomfortable with this can assume that X is
discrete with no substantive changes.
9sequentially rational given the strategy of the other player, and the planner￿ s beliefs are
Bayesian updates of her prior based on the observed history and the advocate￿ s strategy.
In situations where the planner can commit to her strategy, (dynamic delegation), we focus
on Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms, whereby the planner chooses her action to
maximize her ex ante expected payo⁄, subject to inducing truthful disclosure from the
advocate.
The information structure of the advice for in￿ uence game di⁄ers from the standard
information structure in price discrimination and employment settings in the following key
respect: in standard settings the agent￿ s private information is about some attribute of
the agent (e.g. his cost for executing a task, or his valuation for a good), and the only
way for the principal to learn this information is to provide the agent with incentives to
reveal it. In contrast, the advocate￿ s private information is about an exogenous feature of
the planner￿ s problem. Each time she repeats the problem, the planner acquires additional
information about this feature, and in the long run, she can learn the advocate￿ s private
information on her own. This capability to learn plays a critical role in the interactions
we consider.
3 No-Communication Benchmarks
With common knowledge of the severe misalignment in preferences, we would expect that
in a variety of settings, the planner would ignore the advocate￿ s advice. The following
propositions illustrate that under both static delegation and strategic communication,
there is no in￿ uential communication. These no communication results provide motivation
for the dynamic delegation environment that we consider in the following section. Without
the ability to delegate dynamically, there is no in￿ uential communication. They also
provide a context in which to view those results: the dynamics of the delegated decisions,
and all welfare gains are a consequence of the combination of commitment and learning.
We say that communication is in￿uential if both messages are sent in equilibrium, and
for some history15 di⁄erent messages induce the planner to choose di⁄erent actions.
15or non-negligible set of histories
103.1 Static Delegation
In the standard static delegation problem, a decision maker must choose an action. Both
the decision maker￿ s and advisor￿ s preferences depend on some information, privately
known by the advisor. The parties have a con￿ ict of interest: if the advisor￿ s private
information were public, the parties would choose di⁄erent actions. Given a prior, the
decision maker commits to a menu of actions from which the advisor can choose given
what he knows.
To draw the most appropriate parallel between our model and static delegation, imagine
that the planner and advocate interact for only one period. As in the standard delegation
problem, the planner commits to a menu of actions fqH;qLg. Obviously, if qH 6= qL, then
the advocate will optimally issue the recommendation that induces the higher action. In
order for the menu to be incentive compatible, the planner must commit to the same action
for the two reports, so that qH = qL. The advocate￿ s report can not in￿ uence the planner￿ s
choice of action.
Proposition 1.1 In a single period interaction with commitment, in any incentive
compatible mechanism communication is non-in￿uential.
Proposition 1 is in stark contrast to the single encounter cheap talk literature and
the static delegation literature,.both of which demonstrate the possibility of in￿ uential
communication in one time encounters. Here, the advocate￿ s inability to in￿ uence the
planner follows directly from the extreme misalignment of preferences. Intuitively, the
state is only learned after the decision has been made, so the only information that the
planner could use to help her choose an action is the report of the advocate. Because of
the advocate cares only about the action, he will always choose the higher action. The
planner has no choice but to ignore the recommendation.
3.2 Strategic Communication
The planner￿ s situation seems di⁄erent in a setting with multiple periods, because she can
learn about the true distribution from the observed history. However, if the planner is
unable to commit to her strategy (i.e. can not delegate), her actions must be sequentially
rational, and only one action is sequentially rational for any combination of history and
11message. Although the planner will adjust her equilibrium actions to account for her up-
dated beliefs about the state distribution, she is still unable to elicit in￿ uential information
from the advocate.
Proposition 1.2 In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the multiperiod game with-
out commitment the advocate￿ s reporting strategy is independent of his information. There
is no in￿uential communication in equilibrium.
With quadratic preferences, the sequentially rational action following a given history is
the conditional expected value of the state,
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
where ￿ (hk￿1) represents the updated belief that the distribution is low:
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f(hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f(hk￿1j￿L)+(1￿b ￿)f(hk￿1j￿H)
The planner￿ s updated belief ￿ (hk￿1) is monotone in b ￿, her updated belief that the distri-
bution is low following the advocate￿ s report. By sending a message that induces a lower
belief that the distribution is ￿L the advocate increases the planner￿ s action following any
history of states, improving his payo⁄. Therefore, the advocate always sends the message
associated with the lowest possible posterior belief. When b ￿H 6= b ￿L, he sends only one
message in equilibrium, and the posterior belief associated with this message is equal to
the prior belief. If, b ￿H = b ￿L then both messages may be sent in equilibrium, but, if the
posteriors are equal, the probability of sending either messages can￿ t depend on the true
distribution; therefore, both posteriors are equal to the prior, b ￿H = b ￿L = ￿ . In both
cases, no in￿ uential communication takes place in equilibrium.
The ￿ndings of Proposition 1.2 provide an interesting contrast to Morris (2001) and
Sobel (1985) who demonstrate the possibility of in￿ uential communication in repeated
settings where the planner is unable to commit. These analyses focus on what can be
roughly termed, "investment in credibility;" an advisor with unknown preferences may
provide a planner with useful information either because he truly shares her preferences,
or because he would like to establish a reputation for credibility which he can pro￿tably
exploit later. These considerations do not apply, however, when the advisor is an advocate
12with known preferences for extreme actions.16
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 make clear that advocates can have no in￿ uence whatsoever,
unless the planner repeats her problem and can commit to an action policy that depends
on the advocate￿ s report and on the observed history. This is the dynamic delegation
setting that analyze in section 4.
4 Dynamic Delegation
In this section we consider possibility that the planner can commit to a strategy prior to
receiving the advocate￿ s report, relaxing the requirement that the planner￿ s strategy must
be sequentially rational. Once she selects an action, the planner observes the true state;
each time she repeats the problem, she learns about the true distribution. By committing
to actions, the planner can leverage the additional information revealed by the history of
states to dissuade the advocate from issuing self-serving recommendations.17
The planner commits at the beginning of the interaction to her strategy, or mechanism,
m, that speci￿es an action in each period, conditioned on the advocate￿ s recommendation
and the observed history:
m ￿ fqL (hk￿1);qH (hk￿1)g
N
k=1
The advocate privately observes the true distribution and issues a recommendation. Be-
cause the advocate only has one piece of private information, the Revelation Principle
implies that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to mechanisms that in-
duce the advocate to issue a truthful recommendation. Incentive compatibility requires
that the advocate can not induce a higher discounted sum of expected actions by misre-
porting the distribution of the state:
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qL (hk￿1)j￿L] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿L] (ICL)
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qL (hk￿1)j￿H] (ICH)
Because the the planner knows that the advocate￿ s equilibrium report is truthful; her
16We revisit the possibility that the advocate is unbiased in a later section.
17Throughout the history of states is assumed to be veri￿able. Even if the true state is not veri￿able but
some signal correlated with each period￿ s state is veri￿able the mechanism would exhibit similar features.
13expected payo⁄ from o⁄ering m can be written:





(qL (hk￿1) ￿ x)
2 j￿L
￿





(qH (hk￿1) ￿ x)
2 j￿H
￿
Finally, to ensure that the advocate will participate in the mechanism, it is enough that
the planner commit to interpret the absence of a message as a message in support of
distribution ￿L. Constraint (ICH) then ensures that the advocate (weakly) prefers to send
a message than no message at all.
The optimal mechanism maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH). In the absence
of incentive constraints, the planner would choose the ￿rst-best actions (￿H or ￿L), but
these actions are not incentive compatible. At least one of the incentive constraints must
bind. An advocate who learns that the true distribution is ￿H would have no incentive
to report L; whereas, an advocate who knows that the true distribution is ￿L, might
try to manipulate the planner by reporting H instead of L. In light of this intuition, in
the appendix we solve a simple relaxed problem imposing only constraint (ICL).18 The
solution to the relaxed problem always satis￿es (ICH), and therefore characterizes the
optimal mechanism.19
The optimal mechanism depends on three parameters that we introduce now in antic-
ipation of the formal results to follow. First, the history of past states hk￿1 in￿ uences the






The value of the likelihood ratio indicates which of the two possible distributions are more
consistent with the observed history. High values of ￿(hk￿1) support the inference that
the true distribution is ￿L, while low values of ￿(hk￿1) support the inference that the true
18The resulting relaxed problem has a concave payo⁄ function and a linear constraint. The solution to
the relaxed problem is the unique stationary point of the Lagrangian.
19Clearly, any mechanism in which there is no in￿ uential communication (because qH (hk￿1) = qL (hk￿1)
for all histories) always satis￿es these constraints, and is therefore feasible; if it is not chosen, it must be
sub-optimal.









Parameter ￿ is a measure of the "similarity" between distribution ￿L and ￿H. This
parameter plays a signi￿cant role in a variety of statistical settings.21; it is weakly larger
than one, and larger values of ￿ indicate that the distributions are less similar.22 As we
shall see, in the optimal mechanism, ￿ is a measure of the strength of the incentives that
the planner can provide without payments. Finally, the solution also depends on parameter
!N =
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N)
￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
which a⁄ects the optimal distortion from the ￿rst best actions, required to induce the
advocate to make truthful recommendations. We refer to this parameter as the magnitude
of the distortions. We are now ready to state our ￿rst main result.
Proposition 2 The mechanism which maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH) is
characterized as follows:
(a) If the advocate reports L, the planner￿ s action is a constant, greater than her ￿rst
best action ￿L:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N
(b) If the advocate reports H, the planner￿ s action depends on the observed history and
is always less than her ￿rst best action ￿H
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿!N￿(hk￿1)
(c) The planner￿ s and advocate￿ s payo⁄s are given by
VN = V N ￿ 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
UN = (￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
20By convention, ￿(h0) = 1.
21In statistics, this parameter is one added to the value of the ￿2-divergence of the distributions, also
referred to as Pearson￿ s ￿
2. See Pearson (1904), Lancaster (1969), for more information.
22Throughout we assume that ￿ < 1.
15Without access to payments, the planner provides incentives for truthful reporting by
committing to vary her actions in response to history. Truth-telling is optimally induced
by rewarding the advocate when he issues recommendations that he personally ￿nds un-
favorable and punishing the advocate when he reports personally favorable information
that appears to be inconsistent with the observed history of states. When the advocate
reports L, the distortion from the e¢ cient action is a positive constant, (1 ￿ ￿)!N. By
choosing an action higher than the ￿rst best action ￿L, the planner makes a report of L
more attractive for the advocate, which reduces his incentive to lie. We interpret this ￿xed
reward as a commitment to compromise.
The planner commits to treat seemingly self-serving advice based on her assessment of
its validity. When the advocate reports H, the planner commits to a history-dependent
distortion that contains the likelihood ratio, ￿!N￿(hk￿1). If the likelihood ratio is small,
the history of states supports the inference that the distribution is ￿H: The advocate￿ s
advice therefore appears valid, and the planner￿ s action is close to the ￿rst best action ￿H:
If the history of states suggests that the true distribution is ￿L, the advice appears invalid,
and the planner reduces her action. This punishes the advocate but also hurts her payo⁄.
To optimally provide incentives, the planner acts "as if" she is skeptical of the advocate￿ s
advice, cross-checking his recommendation against the observed history, even though she
knows that the advocate￿ s report is truthful. This commitment to update is a common
feature of incentive compatible mechanisms in a variety of settings.23
Dynamically delegated actions exhibit qualitatively di⁄erent dynamics from the case
in which the planner can not commit. As described in Section 3, without commitment,
the planner￿ s optimal action in each period is the expected value of the state, conditional
on the observed history. This action will always lie between the two ideal actions ￿L and
￿H, and will adjust in every period to re￿ ect the additional information acquired from the
previous state. Under dynamic delegation, neither of these properties holds. Recall that if
the advocate reports H, the optimally delegated action is ￿H adjusted down by a penalty
proportional to the likelihood ratio. If certain states, unlikely under ￿H; are likely under
￿L, the associated likelihood ratio can be very large. If one of these states occurs under
￿H, the optimal actions associated with the report of H could be smaller than ￿L. Also
observe that if the true distribution is ￿L, the sequence of optimally delegated actions is
23See for example the seminal paper of Holmstorm (1977).
16￿xed; the action does not adjust in any way to the arrival of new information.
The less similar the distributions (as measured by ￿), the more the planner bene￿ts
under the mechanism. To understand why, observe that if the advocate reports H when
the true distribution is ￿L, he experiences a negative distortion from action ￿H that is pro-
portional to the likelihood ratio. The expected value of the period k distortion is therefore
￿￿!N￿k￿1. Holding !N ￿xed, increases in ￿ lead to greater punishments for an advocate
who tries to manipulate the planner. If the advocate expects a greater punishment for
manipulation, his incentive to do so is reduced; the planner can therefore reduce the mag-
nitude of the distortions, !N; without violating incentive compatibility. If !N is smaller,
then the distortions from the ￿rst-best actions are smaller for every combination of action
and history, improving the planner￿ s payo⁄. Parameter ￿ therefore represents the strength
of the incentives that the planner can provide the advocate by distorting her actions.
Although the planner bene￿ts under this arrangement, the advocate￿ s ex ante payo⁄is
the same as in the absence of in￿ uential communication.24 This is a curious result, in light
of the fact, that standard incentive theory teaches us that privately informed agents must
be paid information rents in order to divulge their information. This result points out an
interesting di⁄erence between our setting and standard settings. In our setting incentive
compatibility does not guarantee each type of advocate a certain share of social surplus.
In some sense, the planner uses the advocate￿ s information against him, leveraging her
own capability to learn to reduce the advocate￿ s incentive to lie. However, in a setting
with costly learning, the absence of rent o⁄ered to the advocate apparently undermines
the advocate￿ s incentive to acquire information. We turn to this issue in the next section.
Before doing so, we brie￿ y consider an application, and then describe the properties of the
optimal mechanism with a large number of periods.
4.1 Application: The Cassandra E⁄ect
According to Greek myth, the god Apollo fell in love with a Trojan princess named Cas-
sandra. As a boon to his beloved, he granted Cassandra the gift of perfect foresight, but
when she spurned his advances, he cursed her. Although she retained the power to per-
24In the absence of in￿ uential communication the planner￿ s sequentially rational action given a history
is just ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H. By the law of iterated expectation, E [￿ (hk￿1)] = ￿.
We would not expect this result to hold if the planner￿ s expected payo⁄ were not a symmetric function.
Nonetheless, we ￿nd this interesting, especially as it relates to later results.
17fectly foretell the future, because of the curse she would never be believed. When the
Greeks o⁄ered the Trojans a wooden horse, Cassandra warned of the impending disaster;
her warnings were ignored, The Trojans brought the horse into the city, and the Greek
force hidden inside was unleashed on the unsuspecting populace.
Imagine that an organization faces certain risks. While the organization can not a⁄ect
the level risk that it faces, it can take certain steps to mitigate the impact of the risky out-
comes. In addition to the risks faced by any organization, however, certain organizations in
"dangerous" situations face the additional possibility of a disaster. In the model we inter-
pret action q as steps taken to mitigate the impact of adverse events, and x is the optimal
level of mitigation given that period￿ s outcome. The advocate is a "whistle-blower" who
bene￿ts directly from these preparatory e⁄orts, and thus has an incentive to exaggerate
the chance of disaster. In the context of the model, we interpret F (xj￿L) as uniform over
support [0;1] while F (xj￿H) is uniform over [0;1][D where minfx 2 Dg ￿ maxfx 2 Xg.
We interpret X as the set of rationalizable preparation measures that would be adopted
by a ￿rm that does not face disasters, while an action in D would be optimal only for
the organization if it knew that a disaster were imminent. Thus a draw in X reveals no
information about whether the situation is dangerous, but a draw in D con￿rms that the
situation is dangerous.
Our results indicate that without the ability to engage in dynamic delegation, the
whistle-blower is subject to the Cassandra e⁄ect: although he knows for certain that a
disaster will occur, because of the misalignment of preferences, he will never be believed.
Under dynamic delegation, following a disaster the organization￿ s type will be revealed, and
it will prepare optimally given the risk of disaster. However, if the whistle-blower claims
that the organization is dangerous, preparations for disaster shrink with every period that
no disaster occurs and may eventually fall below the level that would be optimal if the
organization knew that it were safe. In our setting, safe organizations also over-prepare
for the level of risk that they face.
4.2 Properties of the Mechanism in Long Interactions
In a long interaction (N ! 1), the planner is able to learn the true distribution (with
virtual certainty) from the observed history of states. This raises two interesting issues.
First, to what extent does the planner￿ s ability to learn mitigate the information asym-
18metry that exists at the beginning of the interaction? Second, if the planner can learn
the true distribution, in the long run does the advocate￿ s recommendation impact the
planner￿ s action? Both of these issues are addressed by the following corollary.
Corollary (High Power Incentives) When 1
￿ ￿ ￿ < 1; as N ! 1; !N ! 0; the opti-
mal mechanism approaches the ￿rst best mechanism, and the planner￿ s payo⁄ approaches
the ￿rst best payo⁄, VN ! V 1
(Low Power Incentives) When ￿ < 1
￿, as N ! 1, !N ! !1 2 (0;￿H ￿ ￿L). The
optimal mechanism converges to an incentive compatible mechanism. The planner￿ s pay-
o⁄ is bounded away from the ￿rst best payo⁄. When N = 1 the sequence of actions
qH (hk￿1)
P ! ￿H
To understand this corollary, recall that if the advocate reports H, but the true dis-
tribution is ￿L; he expects a penalty in the future that grows at rate ￿ ￿ 1. However the
long term growth of this penalty may not be enough to completely eliminate his incentive
to manipulate the planner; the advocate￿ s lifetime penalty for manipulating the planner
is the discounted sum of the expected distortions, which may either converge or diverge.
If the incentives are su¢ ciently high powered, this discounted sum diverges. In the limit,
the powerful incentives completely eliminate the advocate￿ s incentive to manipulate the
planner, the distortions vanish, and the optimal mechanism approaches the ￿rst best.25
Thus when incentives have high power, in a long interaction, there is virtually no dif-
ference between information provided by an advocate, and information that the planner
acquires herself.26 If the incentives have low power, the expected penalty explodes too
slowly relative to discounting, and the discounted sum of expected distortions converges.
The planner can not shrink the magnitude of the distortions to zero without violating
incentive compatibility and, the planner￿ s payo⁄s are bounded away from the ￿rst best.
When the true distribution is ￿H, the planner￿ s action converges in probability to the
￿rst best action ￿H;27 therefore, the damaging distortions associated with a report of
25Although the ￿rst best is not incentive compatible, by choosing an arbitrarily large T, and repeating
the optimal T period mechanism an in￿nite number of times, the planner can construct an in￿nitely
repeated mechanism that is incentive compatible and approximates her payo⁄ under the ￿rst best with
arbitrary degree of accuracy. Details available upon request.
26This result does not merely hold in the limit as ￿ ! 1, but is valid for any value of ￿ ￿ 1
￿.
27The asymptotic behavior of the distortions is driven by the asymptotic behavior of the like-
lihood ratio under distribution ￿H, which converges in probability to zero. Therefore, limN!1
Pr(jqH (hN￿1) ￿ ￿Hj ￿ ") = 1, for any ", no matter how small.
19H are inherently a short run phenomenon. However, even in the absence of in￿ uential
communication, the planner￿ s action would converge to ￿H in probability; thus, when
the true distribution is ￿H, the impact of the advocate￿ s recommendation vanishes in the
long run. In contrast, when the true distribution is ￿L, the advocate￿ s impact on the
planner￿ s action never diminishes. Paradoxically, when the advocate makes the seemingly
more believable report, the distortion from the ￿rst best action ￿L persists forever; when
the advocate reports in a seemingly biased way, the distortion from the ￿rst best action
￿H is likely to be small after a large number of periods. In the long run, the advocate￿ s
recommendation only impacts the planner￿ s behavior when he reports against his bias.
5 Motivating a Known Advocate to Learn
Thee theory of dynamic delegation we have developed so far explores how a planner can
elicit a truthful recommendations from an informed, but extremely biased advocate. In
analyzing this question, we assumed that the advocate was already informed before en-
countering the planner. In certain settings, the advocate may need to expend resources
to become informed. For example, in order to form an assessment of the likely costs and
bene￿ts of emissions standards, a polluting ￿rm may need to analyze large amounts of
data. In these situations, the planner￿ s reliance on the advocate seems puzzling; if the
advocate is uninformed initially and has an obvious incentive to manipulate his ￿ndings,
why wouldn￿ t the planner learn from an unbiased party or expend e⁄ort to learn herself?
Furthermore, if (as in the previous section) he expects to have no impact on the planner
the advocate may have weak incentives to acquire information; how can the planner mo-
tivate him to learn? From a social perspective, is it a good idea for the planner to acquire
information from the advocate?
In light of these issues, we consider how the advocate might be motivated to gather
the information that the planner requires to make decisions. In order to acquire informa-
tion, the advocate must expend c ￿ 0 resources, in the form of money, time and e⁄ort;
throughout the section, we focus on the case of relatively small values for c.28 Crucially,
the advocate￿ s decision to become informed can not be observed by the planner. The
28The cuto⁄between small and large costs, e c; is de￿ned in the appendix. While we discuss the mechanism
that induces learning with high costs in a later footnote, we point out that if the cost is high enough,
inducing learning is not in the planner￿ s interest.
20advocate not only has the ability to lie when issuing an informed recommendation, he can
issue a recommendation without exerting e⁄ort to acquire any information at all. We start
by deriving the optimal incentive compatible mechanism that provides incentives for the
advocate to acquire information. This will help us understand how the planner motivates
the advocate to acquire information. We will then compare optimal dynamic delegation to
consulting an impartial advisor or exerting e⁄ort, to help us understand why an advocate
may be preferred to an impartial advisor.
If the planner would like to motivate the advocate to become informed, two additional
constraints appear in the mechanism design problem. If an advocate decides to remain
uninformed, he could just issue an uninformed recommendation, either H or L.29 On
the other hand, if the advocate chooses to acquire information, he anticipates that with
probability ￿ he will learn that the distribution is ￿L, and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ he will
learn that the distribution is ￿H. Whatever, he learns, (ICH) and (ICL) ensure that
he will report truthfully. Therefore, for the advocate to choose to learn, exerting e⁄ort
and reporting truthfully should be preferred by an uninformed advocate to not exerting
e⁄ort and either reporting H all the time (AICH) or reporting L all the time (AICL).
Formulating and simplifying these constraints leads to the following conditions:
PN
k=1 ￿




k￿1E [qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿ (AICL)
Of course, the optimal mechanism must also satisfy the constraints for truthful reporting:
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1) ￿ qL (hk￿1)j￿L] ￿ 0 (ICL)
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1) ￿ qL (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ 0 (ICH)
Writing the constraints in this way makes it apparent that if c = 0, the constraints for
reporting truthfully and the constraints for acquiring it are identical. Furthermore, be-
cause the optimal mechanism of Proposition 3 satis￿es (ICL) as an equality, it violates
constraint (AICH). If information acquisition is costly and subject to moral hazard, then
confronted with the mechanism of Proposition 3, an advocate would never acquire infor-
mation and would always report H. Finally, it is clear that the constraints for incentive
compatible information acquisition imply the incentive constraints for truthful reporting;
29Unless the uninformed advocate is indi⁄erent between reporting H all the time and reporting L all
the time, he would never choose to randomize. In the cases we consider in the body of the paper, an
uninformed advocate always strictly prefers to report H.
21constraints (ICL) and (ICH) can therefore be ignored in the planner￿ s problem. As before,
participation at both interim and ex ante stages is ensured by the planner￿ s commitment
to interpret the absence of a message as a report of L. If the planner makes such a com-
mitment, constraint (AICL) would ensure that the advocate prefers to learn rather than
report nothing to the planner.30
We derive the optimal mechanism that induces information acquisition by maximizing
(P) subject to (AICH) and (AICL).
Proposition 3 For small costs, the mechanism that maximizes (P) subject to (AICH)





(a) The planner￿ s actions are
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) e !N
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿e !N￿(hk￿1)
(b) The planner￿ s and advocate￿ s payo⁄s are given by
V c






1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
Uc
N = UN ￿ c
(c) If !N is not too large, the planner prefers to o⁄er an uninformed advocate the optimal
mechanism to acquire information and report truthfully, rather than pay an impartial
advisor to acquire the information or exert e⁄ort to acquire the information herself
Proposition three indicates that when the cost of acquiring information is strictly pos-
itive the planner "raises the stakes" of the mechanism, rewarding the advocate more when
he reports personally unfavorable information and proportionally increasing the downward
distortion (for every history) when the advocate reports a personally favorable distribu-
tion. Intuitively, there are two types that could pro￿tably deviate by reporting the high
30This may be a strong assumption in certain settings. An analysis of the alternative case is available
upon request.
22distribution: the type that learned that the true distribution is ￿L, and the uninformed
advocate, who is pretending to be informed. Because a report of the low distribution can
still be believed, the structure of the mechanism is similar to the zero-cost case. To moti-
vate the advocate to learn, the magnitude of the distortions needs to be increased relative
to the zero-cost case. With zero cost of information, the goal was to prevent an advocate
from deliberately misleading the planner; here the mechanism also needs to motivate the
advocate to exert e⁄ort to learn, rather than "gamble" by reporting H without learning
anything. This result is similar to Szalay (2005) and Lewis and Sappington (1997) who
￿nd that increasing the variation in payo⁄s for privately informed agents is the optimal
way to induce the agents to gather information.31
In the optimal mechanism the social cost of information acquisition exceeds c. Although
the advocate bears the full cost c himself, in order to motivate the advocate to learn,
the planner must increase the magnitude of the distortions inherent in the mechanism.
Increased distortions harm the planner. If the planner can acquire the information herself
at cost c (or hire an impartial advisor to do so on her behalf), it is socially wasteful for
the planner to rely on the advocate.
Although it is socially ine¢ cient, the planner may prefer to deal with the advocate
rather than pay an impartial agent or acquire the information herself (at cost c).32 If she
chooses to acquire information herself, the planner can implement the ￿rst best actions,
which leads to a payo⁄ of V N ￿ c. If she o⁄ers the advocate the optimal mechanism, her
payo⁄ is given by V c
N, above. Comparing these expressions it is clear that the planner
would prefer to interact with the advocate if the cost of information c, were greater than
31In the case of large costs the optimal mechanism is quite di⁄erent. When the cost of becoming
informed is very high, not becoming informed at all becomes tempting for the advocate. Although no
advocate would ever report L to manipulate the decision maker, if the cost of acquiring information is
very high, the advocate may report L as a way to avoid learning the true distribution. The decision maker
must cross-check both reports against the history in order to provide the advocate with incentives to exert
e⁄ort in learning the true distribution.
32The assumption that information is soft applies to information acquired by the planner as well as to
information acquired by the advocate. This assumption rules out situations in which the planner commits
to learn on her own with " probability, and threatens the advocate that, if she learns and discovers that his
report was wrong, she will implement extremely negative actions. By doing so, she will acquire information
with arbitrarily small distortion. To implement this scheme it is crucial that a third party can verify the
information, to ensure that the planner follows through on her promise to uncover information and punish
lies.









!N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
A small value of !N ensures that this inequality is satis￿ed;33 it also guarantees that the
planner prefers the mechanism that induces learning to going it alone.34
This result may seem quite surprising, but the rationale for the planners￿preference to
consult an advocate for advice is quite compelling. Imagine that the planner has access
to the same information acquisition technology as the advocate. If she exerts e⁄ort to
learn,.the planner doesn￿ t need to worry about truthful revelation of information, but she
bears the full cost of information acquisition. On the other hand, because of his extreme
bias, when dealing with an advocate, the planner bears a cost of inducing the advocate to
truthfully report his information; however, because he cares about her actions, the planner
can use her actions to motivate the advocate to acquire information. By increasing the
magnitude of the distortions, the planner passes the direct cost of information acquisition
to the advocate, hurting her own expected payo⁄ in the process. However, when the
advocate expects a large lifetime penalty from reporting H when the true distribution is
￿L, either deliberately or because he is uninformed, the planner does not need to increase
the magnitude very much (in absolute terms) in order to induce learning. In this case the
total loss of payo⁄ to the planner from acquiring truthful information using the optimal
mechanism is smaller than the cost of direct information acquisition.
This result suggests an important explanation for the prominence of advocates in many
regulatory, policy making and personal decision making processes. In contrast to impartial
advisors, advocates represent a particular point of view or interest that is a⁄ected by the
planner￿ s decision. Because of this, the planner has some power over the advocate; she can
use her decisions to motivate the advocate to acquire information. As a result it can be
easier and less costly for a planner to rely on a biased advocate rather than an objective
adviser to acquire the information that is needed for decision making. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999) make a complementary argument in their explanation of why an advocacy
33As discussed in the previous section, if ￿ ￿ 1
￿, then as N ! 1, !N ! 0. Alternatively, keeping N
￿xed, if ￿ is large then !N is close to zero.
34It is worth pointing out that for su¢ ciently small costs, the planner prefers the mechanism that
induces learning to the case of no in￿ uential communication, regardless of !N. Because the mechanism
with c = 0 is always preferred by the planner to the case without in￿ uential communication, by continuity,
for c small, the mechanism is also be preferred to the case without in￿ uential communication.
24system may be preferred to a tribunal in fact ￿nding processes. Che and Kartik (2009)
point to a related rationale to explain why planners may prefer to consult with advisers who
share their preferences but have di⁄erent prior beliefs about the best action to take. In both
of these settings no manipulation is possible. In some sense, both of these analyses argue
that interested parties have more to gain from establishing the truth of their preferred
positions and are therefore more willing to work hard to uncover information. In contrast,
we show that when manipulation is possible, an interested party has more to lose if it
becomes clear that its report is wrong. This threat of potential loss provides the interested
party with an extra incentive to acquire information.
5.1 Discovering Hidden Agendas
Known advocates can not escape from the fact that they have no inherent credibility; any
in￿ uence which they have on decision making is exclusively a consequence of the planner￿ s
design. Even if the advocate for children has acquired excellent information about the likely
bene￿ts of the head start program, because it is common knowledge that he supports this
cause, only the planner can provide the advocate with incentives to reveal his information
truthfully, thereby giving the advice credibility and in￿ uence. Is this inevitable? Can the
advocate exert a greater impact for her cause by being less transparent to the commission
about the issues that he supports?
Imagine that the planner is crafting new legislation that de￿nes the goals and responsi-
bilities for a future health and welfare initiative.35 The legislation prioritizes support for a
variety of social programs, including education, health and human services, and childhood
nutrition. The planner requires the advice of a knowledgeable advisor on how to draft the
legislation to be most e⁄ective. The advisor￿ s motives for advising the planner may be
unknown; he may have an allegiance to a special interest group whose agenda he would like
to promote, or he may have no agenda at all, issuing truthful recommendations without
concern for their impact on the legislation. Alternatively, imagine that a ￿nancial advisor
is o⁄ering a client investment advice and services. In o⁄ering advice, he may be pursuing
his own bottom line, or he may feel bound by certain oaths or obligations to place the
interests of the client ahead of his own.
To account for these possibilities, we admit the possibility that the advisor is impartial
35A similar example is in Morris (2001).
25into the model. An impartial advisor is indi⁄erent over actions and is always willing
to report his information truthfully. If the planner could observe that her advisor is
impartial, she would optimally delegate her choice of action to him with no restrictions.
However, if the advisor￿ s con￿ ict of interest is privately known, an advocate would have an
incentive to misrepresent himself as impartial in order to give a manipulative report of H
the appearance of credibility. We therefore augment the mechanism to provide incentives
for an advisor to voluntarily reveal a hidden agenda, if it exists.
In analyzing this issue, we assume that the planner can not prevent the advisor from
learning both the true distribution and his preferences simultaneously. If it were possible
for the planner to control the advisor￿ s access to information, the planner would require
that the advisor disclose a con￿ ict of interest before allowing him to learn the true distri-
bution. We do not allow this type of restriction to avoid discussing the issue of whether
this type of control over information is possible, how the planner could implement this
type of restriction and whether such a restriction is consistent with zero cost of learning,
which we assume throughout this section.36
With uncertainty about the advisor￿ s preferences, the agreement between the planner
and the advisor is governed by a mechanism that is more elaborate than in earlier sections.
With a hidden agenda, there are two possible types of advisors, advocates (with a hidden
agenda) and impartial advisors. The advisor￿ s private information consists of the true
distribution and his agenda, and could be of four possible types. We assume that the
probability that the advisor is an advocate is a; we also assume that the advisor￿ s agenda
is statistically independent of whether the distribution is ￿H or ￿L. The mechanism
o⁄ered by the planner is therefore a family of four functions, one function for each possible













If the advocate reports that he has preferences t 2 fi;ag (where i denotes the impartial
type), and that the true distribution is ￿Z, the planner commits to implement actions
qt
Z (hk￿1). The planner￿ s expected payo⁄ from an incentive compatible mechanism is just
a weighted average of her payo⁄s from the "sub-mechanism" intended for the impartial
36In the extended appendix we analyze the optimal mechanism assuming that the planner can restrict
access to information in this way. We will discuss some of the results in a later footnote. Interested readers
should consult the extended appendix for more information.
26advisor, mi = (qi
H (hk￿1);qi




P d (mi;ma) = (1 ￿ a)P (mi) + aP (ma)
In order for the mechanism to be incentive compatible, the advisor should be willing to
disclose both the distribution and his con￿ ict of interest truthfully. Because the impartial
advisor is indi⁄erent over all possible outcomes, he is always willing to do so; however, the
advocate type needs incentives to report truthfully. This leads to a set of six incentive




Z (hk￿1) ￿ qa




Z (hk￿1) ￿ qa
H (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ 0 (ICH-Z,t)
Z 2 fH;Lg;t 2 fi;ag
The optimal mechanism maximizes (PD) subject to the system (ICD). Intuitively,
we would expect that several of these constraints would not be binding in the optimal
mechanism.37 In the appendix we formulate a relaxed problem in which we impose only
constraints (ICL-H,a), (ICL-H,i). We then prove that the solution to the relaxed prob-
lem satis￿es the remaining constraints, and therefore characterizes the optimal incentive
compatible mechanism. Before stating the proposition, we introduce a parameter:
￿ = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
This parameter is very similar to the magnitude introduced in section 3; in fact, a = 1
implies ￿ = !N. Furthermore, parameter ￿ plays a very similar role to !N in the optimal
mechanism, but unlike !N which enters the planner￿ s promised actions in a "symmetric"
way in propositions 2 and 3, ￿ does not enter in a symmetric way in proposition 4.
37The advocate has an incentive to claim to be impartial in order to give a manipulative report of
H additional credibility. There is no reason for the advocate to claim to be impartial, while issuing a
report of L. Furthermore, following the reasoning in section 3, we would also suspect that (ICH-L,a) is
non-binding. There is no simple intuition that suggests that either of the remaining constraints are non-
binding: an advocate who knows the distribution is ￿L could potentially bene￿t by reporting H (ICL-H,a),
he could also potentially bene￿t by claiming to be impartial and reporting H (ICL-H,i). Furthermore, the
advocate who knows that the true distribution is ￿H could try to gain additional credibility by claiming
to be impartial and reporting H (ICH-H,i). Although there is no good reason to eliminate (ICH-H,i), it
turns out to be active in the optimal mechanism, but with a zero Lagrange multiplier; it is active but not
binding.
27Proposition 4 The mechanism that maximizes (PD) subject to (ICD) is characterized
as follows:
(a) If the advisor claims to be impartial and reports L, the planner￿ s action is equal to
the ￿rst best action
q
i
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
(b) If the advisor claims to be an advocate and reports L, the planner￿ s action is a
constant, greater than her ￿rst best action ￿L:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
(c) If the advisor reports H, regardless of his claim about his preferences, the planner￿ s




H (hk￿1) = q
a
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
(d) If the advisor is an advocate his expected payo⁄ is given by
UN + 1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿:
Proposition 4 illustrates the di⁄erences that arise when the advocate￿ s preferences on a
speci￿c issue are not common knowledge. Because the advocate would have no reason to
claim to be impartial and then report L, a report of L from an advisor who claims to be
impartial can be believed at face value. A report of H is treated identically, whether the
advisor is an advocate or claims to be impartial; however, the magnitude of the distortion
associated with a self serving report, a￿N, is smaller the greater the probability that the
advisor is impartial. The possibility that the advisor is impartial allows the planner to
treat reports of H with greater credibility. On the other hand, the constant distortion
induced when the advisor reveals a con￿ ict of interest, but reports against his bias is
larger when there is a possibility that the advisor may be impartial. Because the planner
gives greater credibility to reports of H, these reports are more attractive to an advocate
who knows that the distribution is actually ￿L.This increases the advocate￿ s incentive to
issue manipulative advice, and the planner must compensate the advocate for reporting L
28with an additional distortion.38
The advocate￿ s world changes for the better when he becomes less transparent and his
allegiance to special interests are more di¢ cult to predict. When there is a possibility that
the advocate is not an advocate but rather an impartial advisor, the planner bene￿ts from
a greater compromise with the true advocate. The advocate earns a rent for disclosing his
agenda, and his ex ante payo⁄ from the mechanism rises above UN, his expected payo⁄
if he were not consulted and his advice was totally ignored. Finally, the advocate is able
to have a positive impact on the welfare of the special interests that he supports. It is
ironic, however, that in order to help his cause the advocate must disavow and conceal
his support of the cause that he cares so deeply about! In e⁄ect, just as Morris (2001)
demonstrates that "bad advisors" can gain a reputation for being impartial, and Sobel
￿nds that "unfriendly" advisors can establish a reputation for acting in the best interests
of the decision maker, we ￿nd that if the advocate￿ s ties to special interests are hidden,
the advocate can credibly claim to be impartial, and is therefore better o⁄.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we illustrate the power of dynamic delegation to mitigate extreme con￿ icts
of interest. We consider a planner who receives advice from an advocate. The advocate￿ s
preferences are increasing in the action chosen by the planner and are independent of the
true state. We ￿rst demonstrated that advocates can only in￿ uence the planner￿ s decisions
under dynamic delegation; under either strategic communication or static delegation no
useful information is conveyed. These results demonstrate the negative consequences of
the severe interest con￿ ict that we consider in the paper. If the planner can delegate
dynamically we ￿nd that she can elicit in￿ uential information from the advocate. The
optimal delegation policy is characterized by compromise with an advocate who reports
against his bias, and by a commitment to evaluate the validity of seemingly self-serving
advice. Moreover, we show that planners may prefer the advice of a biased advocate to
38Similar results hold if the planner can prevent the advocate from learning the true distribution until
he has disclosed his interest con￿ ict. In that setting, the planner is able to treat the advice of an impartial
advisor who reports H di⁄erently from the advice of an advocate who reports H. Both of these sequences
of messages lead to stochastic distortions that depend of ￿(hk￿1), but the impartial type generates smaller
distortions on average; however the advocate does not capitalize on this because he earns a rent. See the
extended appendix for more information.
29the recommendation of an indi⁄erent adviser in instances where information about the
planner￿ s problem is costly to acquire. The mechanism underlying this result is closely
tied to the combination of learning and commitment at the heart of this paper. Finally
our theory predicts that advocates are better served to conceal their ties to special interest
as this permits them to have greater sway over the planners that they advise.
Our theory of dynamic delegation is special in a number of respects and some of the
predictions of our model should be interpreted with care. One set of special assumptions
is the linear-quadratic preference structure. If the advocate has preferences that are state-
independent then the assumption of a linear payo⁄function for the advocate is without loss
of generality: simply "rescale" the planner￿ s action so that the decision variable is equal
to the advocate￿ s utility. In a more general model, however, the planner would have a
concave single-peaked payo⁄function; virtually all of the qualitative results of the current
speci￿cation carry over to such an environment. However, the result that the advocate
gets the same ex ante payo⁄ under dynamic delegation as under no communication is un-
likely to generalize to more general speci￿cations. We also make the somewhat restrictive
assumption that there is just one advocate who can advise the planner. This assumption
makes the planner￿ s problem as di¢ cult as possible and therefore underscores the power
of dynamic delegation. However, in many applications, it is common for decision makers
to consult two or more advocates representing opposing interests. One fruitful direction
for future research would be to extend our analysis to consider how ￿dueling￿advocates
representing disparate points of view may be most e⁄ectively paired to provide informa-
tive advice to a policy maker. More generally, the optimal use of advocates with known
allegiances might be analyzed as an optimal fact ￿nding mechanisms in which informed
parties with di⁄ering views are assigned to gather information and make recommendations
to a common decision maker who may commit to a course of action conditional on the
recommendations of the advocates as well as their relative ￿track￿records in predicting
the history of states. All of these extensions are unlikely to change the main message of
this paper: the combination of commitment and learning can mitigate or overcome even
the most extreme interest con￿ icts.
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347 Appendix
In the appendix we prove the results discussed in the body of the text. A more complete
appendix with proofs of assertions in footnotes is available upon request.
Proposition 1.1 In a single period interaction with commitment, the only incentive com-
patible mechanism is non-in￿uential: qH = qL:
Proof 1.1 Discussed in text
Lemma 1: If the decision maker begins with belief b ￿ that the true distribution is ￿L, the
unique sequentially rational action in period k following history hk￿1 is the expected value
of the state, updated based on the observed history:
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
Proof: If she begins her sequence of decisions with belief Pr(￿ = ￿L) = b ￿ the sequentially









































2 + 2￿Lq (hk￿1) ￿ ￿L
￿
dhk￿1









2 + 2￿Hq (hk￿1) ￿ ￿H
￿
dhk￿1
by introducing a variable to denote the decision maker￿ s belief that the distribution is
￿L given the observed history of states, ￿ (hk￿1); and the conditional mean, ￿(hk￿1) the
35objective function can be simpli￿ed even further
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
￿(hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H










2 + 2￿(hk￿1)q (hk￿1) ￿ ￿ (hk￿1)
￿
dhk￿1
The ￿rst and second order conditions imply that the unique sequentially rational decision
following history hk￿1 is given by
q (hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
Therefore, given an initial belief b ￿, following observed history hk￿1 the unique sequentially
rational actions is
e q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
QED
Proposition 1.2 In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the multiperiod game without
commitment the advocate￿ s reporting strategy is independent of his information. There is
no in￿uential communication in equilibrium.
Proof: We prove this result by constructing the PBE of this game. Once the planner
receives a message from the advocate, she Bayesian updates her belief that the distribu-
tion is ￿L to either b ￿H or b ￿L. She then faces a repeated single-player decision problem.
According to Lemma 1, the planner￿ s unique sequentially rational action following history
36hk￿1; given that her initial belief is b ￿ is the conditional expected value of the state.
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
Because ￿ (hk￿1) is monotone decreasing with respect to b ￿, inducing a smaller value of
b ￿ increases the planner￿ s action following every history, bene￿tting the advocate. Recall
that the advocate￿ s strategy is just (rH;rL) 2 [0;1]
2, where rX represents the probability
that the advocate reports H when the true distribution is ￿X. The advocate￿ s sequentially
rational strategy is therefore
b ￿H > b ￿L ! rH = 0; rL = 0
b ￿H < b ￿L ! rH = 1; rL = 1
b ￿H = b ￿L ! rH 2 [0;1]; rL 2 [0;1]
Consider ￿rst the case in which b ￿H > b ￿L (the reverse case is identical, replacing H
and L). In this case, the advocate always reports L. Upon observing L, the planner￿ s
Bayesian update is equal to the prior, b ￿L = ￿. The o⁄-the path-belief associated with a
report of H is assigned to be any value b ￿H > ￿. The planner￿ s actions are q (￿;hk￿1) if the
advocate reports L and the planner observes history hk￿1, and q (b ￿H;hk￿1) if the planner
receives message H and observes history hk￿1 (o⁄ the equilibrium path):These strategies
and beliefs together constitute a PBE.
The remaining possibility is that b ￿H = b ￿L. In this case, the advocate can send either
message with any probability, as the advocate is indi⁄erent between the messages. If only
one message is sent in equilibrium the PBE is identical to the one described previously. If
both messages are sent in equilibrium, then according to Bayes Rule,
b ￿H =
￿rL
￿rL + (1 ￿ ￿)rH
b ￿L =
￿ (1 ￿ rL)
￿ (1 ￿ rL) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ rH)
37It a matter if calculation to verify that
b ￿H = b ￿L ! rH = rL
rH = rL ! b ￿H = b ￿L = ￿
Thus, the only other possible PBE has rH = rL = r 2 (0;1), b ￿H = b ￿L = ￿, and an
action conditional on history q (￿;hk￿1), regardless of the message sent. In both cases, the
Bayesian update on the equilibrium path is equal to the prior, and on the equilibrium path,
the planner￿ s actions are q (￿;hk￿1). There is no in￿ uential communication in equilibrium.
QED
Lemma 2 A mechanism qL (hk￿1) = ￿L+(1 ￿ ￿)w, qH (hk￿1) = ￿H￿￿w￿(hk￿1) satis￿es




k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿

























f (hk￿1j￿H)(￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)w)dhk￿1
Because f (hk￿1j￿H)￿(hk￿1) = f (hk￿1j￿L), this line simpli￿es
(￿H ￿ ￿w) 1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)w) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
,
w ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L
QED
Lemma 3 The planner￿s payo⁄ under mechanism qL (hk￿1) = ￿L+(1 ￿ ￿)w, qH (hk￿1) =
38￿H ￿ ￿w￿(hk￿1) is given by.
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H ￿ ￿2w2￿2 (hk￿1))dhk￿1 =
V N ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w2
￿
1￿￿N






Proposition 2 The mechanism which maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH) is char-
acterized by
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N








￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
39provided ￿ is ￿nite. The planner￿ s payo⁄ VN, and the advocate￿ s payo⁄ UN are given by
VN = V N ￿ 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
UN = (￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
Proof: We ￿rst derive the optimal mechanism in a relaxed problem, imposing only con-
straint (ICL). Using Lemma 2, we show that the solution satis￿es constraint (ICH). Finally












































f (hk￿1j￿L)qH (hk￿1)dhk￿1 (ICL)
The objective problem is strictly concave, and the constraint is linear. The solution
is therefore the unique stationary point of the Lagrangian. Simplifying the planner￿ s































f (hk￿1j￿L)[qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1)]dhk￿1
40The stationarity conditions are therefore,
qL (hk￿1) : ￿
k￿1f (hk￿1j￿L)f2￿ (￿L ￿ qL (hk￿1)) + ￿g = 0
qH (hk￿1) : ￿
k￿1f (hk￿1j￿H)
n











f (hk￿1j￿L)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 = 0
These ￿rst order conditions imply that:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + ￿
2￿





2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Then the ￿rst order conditions simplify to
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿!N￿(hk￿1)






















































+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
N￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)
By Lemma 2, to establish that this mechanism satis￿es (ICH) it is enough to verify that
!N ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L):
!N ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L ,
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N)
￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) ￿ 1 ,




















where the last line follows because ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, we calculate the expected payo⁄s. For
the planner apply Lemma 3:









V N ￿ 1￿￿N


























UN = ￿uL + (1 ￿ ￿)uH







Proposition 3 For small costs, the mechanism that maximizes (P) subject to (AICH) and
(AICL) is given by
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) e !N




Constraint (AICH) is active at the optimum, and constraint (AICL) is slack. The planner￿ s
payo⁄ under this contract is given by
V c








!N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
while the advocate￿ s payo⁄ is UN ￿ c.









































f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿ (AICL)





















































The stationarity conditions conditions are:














44Making our favorite substitution:
￿H = 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!H
￿L = 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!L
The complete set of Kuhn Tucker conditions can be written:
Stat: qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!L
f(hk￿1j￿H)
f(hk￿1j￿L)












































f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿
DF !H ￿ 0, !L ￿ 0
Consider ￿rst the !H > 0, !L = 0 (AICH Active, AICL Slack): In this case, the
most pressing deviation that must be prevented is that of an uninformed advocate who
represents himself as informed, and learning that the true distribution is ￿H: This case is
most similar to the zero-cost case. Under this assumption, the KT conditions become
Stat: qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!H



















f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿
DF !H ￿ 0




























k￿1 (!H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)) ￿ ￿
c
1 ￿ ￿











































































































we have a solution. As established previously, when c = 0, this condition is satis￿ed.
The left hand side of the inequality grows with c, while the right hand side shrinks. Both
sides are linear in c, and therefore there is only one intersection. Call the intersection e c.
For c ￿ e c the solution presented holds. Applying Lemma 3 yields:
47V
C



































!N (￿H ￿ ￿L)
This proves Proposition 3
QED
Proposition 4 The mechanism that maximizes (PD) subject to (ICD) is given by
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿N
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿N)
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi
H (hk￿1) = qa
H (hk￿1)
￿N = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
If the advisor is an advocate, his expected payo⁄ under this mechanism is given by UN +
1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿N.








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa







H (hk￿1) ￿ qa
L (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0
This problem has a concave objective function and linear constraints. The KT conditions
therefore characterize the solution. Making substitutions
￿1
2(1 ￿ a)a(1 ￿ ￿)￿
= !1
￿2
2a￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
= !2
48and assuming both constraints are binding, the KT conditions reduce to
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi







L (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1
qa










H (hk￿1) ￿ qa







H (hk￿1) ￿ qa








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa
















￿H ￿ a￿!1￿k￿1 ￿ ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1
￿
= 0 ￿





!1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !2 + 1￿￿N








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa




















1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1 ￿
￿






1￿￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L) = 0
It is straightforward to check that:
!1 = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
!2 = a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
49and both of these values are positive. The solution to the relaxed problem is therefore:
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)
￿
a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿
qa
L (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
As in the proposition: The other constraints need to be veri￿ed. Because (H;i) is treated
the same as a report of (H;a) a ￿H-advocate has no gain from reporting (H;i). For the









H (hk￿1) ￿ q
a





























H (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0



























H (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0






























a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿￿




a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿
￿
￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)


















To verify the advocate￿ s payo⁄, note that the advocate is o⁄ered mechanism:
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)a￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
As previously established, a mechanism
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)a￿
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
leaves the advocate with payo⁄UN. Therefore, if the advisor is an advocate, and draws L,
(probability ￿) the planner selects a higher action in each period than under the no-rent







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿
51QED
52